7th Week



Cryptographic Concepts for Finite Automata

Synopsis.

- One-Way Functions and Hardcores
- Pseudorandom Generators
- Interactive Proof Systems
- Primeimmunity

May 21, 2018. 23:59

Course Schedule: 16 Weeks Subject to Change

- Week 1: Basic Computation Models
- Week 2: NP-Completeness, Probabilistic and Counting Complexity Classes
- Week 3: Space Complexity and the Linear Space Hypothesis
- Week 4: Relativizations and Hierarchies
- Week 5: Structural Properties by Finite Automata
- Week 6: Stype-2 Computability, Multi-Valued Functions, and State Complexity
- Week 7: Cryptographic Concepts for Finite Automata
- Week 8: Constraint Satisfaction Problems
- Week 9: Combinatorial Optimization Problems
- Week 10: Average-Case Complexity
- Week 11: Basics of Quantum Information
- Week 12: BQP, NQP, Quantum NP, and Quantum Finite Automata
- Week 13: Quantum State Complexity and Advice
- Week 14: Quantum Cryptographic Systems
- Week 15: Quantum Interactive Proofs
- Week 16: Final Evaluation Day (no lecture)

YouTube Videos

- This lecture series is based on numerous papers of T. Yamakami. He gave conference talks (in English) and invited talks (in English), some of which were videorecorded and uploaded to YouTube.
- Use the following keywords to find a playlist of those videos.
- YouTube search keywords:

Tomoyuki Yamakami conference invited talk playlist





Main References by T. Yamakami



- T. Yamakami. Immunity and pseudorandomness of contextfree languages. Theor. Comput. Sci. 412(45): 6432-6450 (2011)
- T. Yamakami. Not all multi-valued partial CFL functions are refined by single-valued functions (extended abstract). In Proc. of IFIP TCS 2014, Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol. 8705, pp. 136-150 (2014)
- T. Yamakami. Structural complexity of multi-valued partial functions computed by nondeterministic pushdown automata. ICTCS 2014, CEUR Workshop Proceedings 1231, CEUR-WS.org 2014, pp. 225-236 (2014)
- T. Yamakami. Pseudorandom generators against advised context-free languages. Theor. Comput. Sci. 613: 1-27 (2016)

I. One-Way Functions and Pseudorandom Generators

- 1. Cryptographic Primitives
- 2. (Strongly) One-Way Functions
- 3. Weakly One-Way Functions
- 4. Natural Candidates for OWFs
- 5. Pseudorandomness
- 6. Polynomial-Time Indistinguishability
- 7. Generating Pseudorandom Bits
- 8. Pseudorandom Generators
- 9. PEGs Versus OWFs

Cryptographic Primitives



- If we want to build a complex cryptographic system, it is necessary to break it into small building blocks.
- Primitives are such building blocks that support complex cryptographic systems.



What are One-Way Functions?

- Yao (1982) first considered the notion of one-way function.
- Intuitively, a (strongly) one-way function f(x) is
 Easy to compute from its inputs x, but
 - > <u>Hard</u> to invert from its images y=f(x) (i.e., find $x' \in f^{-1}(y)$).

 $Prob_{x,A}[f(A(f(x),1^n)) = f(x)] < 1/p(n)$ for any efficient algorithm A, any polynomial p and almost all sizes n.



Probabilistic Poly-Time Algorithms (revisited)

- Recall the model of probabilistic Turing machine from Week 2.
- We informally use the term "probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm" to mean "probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine."

Probabilistic Computation of PTMs (revisited)

• A PTM produces accepting/rejecting computation paths.



(Strongly) One-Way Functions I

• Consider a function $f : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$.

 U_n is a random variable ranging over $\{0,1\}^n$.

- f is (strongly) one-way if
 - 1. (easy to compute) there is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that computes f, and
 - 2. (hard to invert) for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial p, and for all sufficiently large length n,

$$\Pr_{A,U_n}\left[A(f(U_n),1^n) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n))\right] < \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

(Strongly) One-Way Functions II

$$\Pr\left[A(f(U_n), 1^n) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n))\right] < \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

- This formula means:
 - It the probability that, on input (y,1ⁿ) with y∈{ f(x) | x∈ {0,1}ⁿ }, algorithm A finds x' satisfying f(x') = y is polynomially small.
- Note that there are possibly many x' satisfying f(x') = y.
- So, it suffices to find at least one of them probabilistically.



Weakly One-Way Functions

- There is another notion of one-way function.
- f is weakly one-way if
 - 1. (easy to compute) there is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that computes f, and
 - 2. (slightly hard to invert) there exists a polynomial p such that, for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A and all sufficiently large length n,

$$\operatorname{Pr}_{A,U_n}\left[A(f(U_n),1^n) \notin f^{-1}(f(U_n))\right] > \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

 (Claim) A strongly one-way function exists ⇔ a weakly one-way function exists. [Yao (1982)]

Natural Candidates for OWFs I

- Unfortunately, we do not know whether or not one-way functions (OWFs) exist.
- However, we have several good candidates for OWFs.
- The RSA function
 - with index set (N,e), where N is a product of two (1/2·log₂N)-bit primes P and Q, and e is an integer smaller than N and relatively prime to (P-1)(Q-1).

$$RSA_{N,e}(x) = x^e \mod N$$

- The Rabin function
 - with a similar condition to the above,

$$Rabin_N(x) = x^2 \mod N$$

There is no common factor.

Natural Candidates for OWFs II

- The DLP (discrete logarithm problem) function
 - with index set (P, G), where P is a (1/2·log₂N)-bit prime P and a primitive element G in the multiplicative group modulo P,

$$DLP_{P,G}(x) = G^x \mod P$$

- Open Problems
 - Prove or disprove that the aforementioned candidates are truly one-way functions.
 - More generally, prove or disprove the existence of one-way functions.

Pseudorandomness

- Blum and Micali (1984) considered how to generate a sequence of bits whose next bit is hardly predicted by even powerful adversary.
- In contrast, Yao (1982) considered a sequence that no adversary distinguishes from a uniformly random sequence with a small margin of error.
- Let X = { X_n }_{n∈N} be an ensemble of random variables indexed by N.
- For example, consider an infinite series of fair coins. For each n∈N, we define Xn to be the outcome of the flip of the (n+1)th coin.

Polynomial-Time Indistinguishability

- We start with "indistinguishability" of two ensembles of random variables.
- Two ensembles X = { X_n }_{n∈N} and Y = { Y_n }_{n∈N} are indistinguishable in polynomial time (or computationally indistinguishable) if
 - for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm M, every positive polynomial p, and all sufficiently large length n,

$$\left| \Pr\left[M(X_n, 1^n) = 1 \right] - \Pr\left[M(Y_n, 1^n) = 1 \right] \right| < \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

The probability of distinguishing between X_n and Y_n is polynomially small.

Generating Pseudorandom Bits



"uniform" ensemble

U_{l(n)} is chosen uniformly at random. udorandom Generators

- An ensemble X = { X_n }_{n∈N} is called pseudorandom if there is a uniform ensemble U = { U_{l(n)} }_{n∈N} such that { G(U_n) }_{n∈N} and U are polynomial-time indistinguishable, where I: N → N is a fixed function.
- A pseudorandom generator G is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm satisfying the following two conditions:
 - 1. (expansion) there is a function I: $N \rightarrow N$ (called the expansion/stretch factor of G) such that I(n) > n for all $n \in N$ and |G(s)| = I(|s|) for all $s \in \{0,1\}^*$, and
 - 2. (pseudorandomness) the ensemble { $G(U_n)$ } $_{n \in N}$ is pseudorandom.

PRGs Versus OWFs

- Let G: $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ be a function with expansion factor I(n) = 2n (that is, |G(x)| = 2|x| for all $x \in \{0,1\}^*$).
- We define a function f: $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ by

f(x, y) = G(x)

- (Claim) If G is a pseudorandom generator, then f is a strongly one-way function.
- Moreover, we can prove the following.
- (Claim) If there exists a one-way function, then a pseudorandom generator exists. [Håstad-Impagliazzo-Levin-Luby (1999)]

II. Hardcore Functions

- 1. What are Hardcore Functions?
- 2. Hardcore Predicates (or Functions)
- 3. Examples of Hardcores
- 4. Why are Hardcores so Useful?

What are Hardcore Functions?

- A hardcore function P for a function f is
 - Easy to compute from its inputs x, but
 - Hard to "predict" P(x) from the images f(x) of the function f without knowing inputs x.

 $|\operatorname{Prob}_{x,A}[A(f(x),1^n) = P(x)] - 1/2^{l(n)}| < 1/p(n)$ for any polynomial p and almost all sizes n.

where I(n) is the size function of P





Hardcore Predicates (or Functions)

- Let b: {0,1}*→ {0,1} be a polynomial-time computable predicate (i.e., functions outputting 0 or 1).
- Let f: $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ be a function.
- b is a hardcore predicate (or a hardcore) of f if, for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial p, and all sufficiently large n, $\Pr[A(f(U_n) = b(U_n)] < \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{p(n)}$
- This means that, to predict the value b(s) from input f(s) is similar to choosing 0 or 1 at random.
- Hardcores actually exist for any strongly one-way function (assuming that one-way functions exist).

Examples of Hardcores

- There are known hardcore predicates for (strongly) oneway functions of a special form (explained below).
- Let b: {0,1}*×{0,1}*→ {0,1} be the (bitwise) inner-productmod-2 function; that is, b(x,r) = x⊙r (mod 2).
- Example: $b(1011,1101) = 1 \cdot 1 + 0 \cdot 1 + 1 \cdot 0 + 1 \cdot 1 \pmod{2}$ = 2 (mod 2) = 0
- (Claim) Let f be any strongly one-way function. Define g as g(x,r) = f(x)r (concatenation), where |x|=|r|. The predicate b (defined above) is a hardcore of g. [Goldreich-Levin (1989)]

Why are Hardcores so Useful?

It's like a magic!

- Let f be any one-way permutation and let P be any hardcore predicate for f.
- Define G(x) = f(x)P(x) (string concatenation).
- The definition of a hardcore says that we cannot predict the value P(x) from the value f(x) with high confidence.



- Well-Known Result: unpredictability = pseudorandomness
- Therefore, this function G(.) is a pseudorandom generator that stretches n bit seeds to n+1 bit strings.

III. Basic Cryptosystems

- 1. Public-Key Cryptosystems
- 2. Non-Interactive Bit Commitment

Private-Key/Public-Key Encryption Schemes



Non-Interactive Bit Commitment

- In a non-interactive bit commitment scheme, a committer (Alice) and a verifier (Bob) communicate with each other and satisfy the following conditions.
 - (hiding) In the commit phase, Alice commits to a single bit b and sends some information z to Bob so that Bob cannot recover b from z,
 - (binding) In the opening (or reveal) phase, Alice reveals her bit b and Bob checks if b is the correct committed bit from z. We require that Alice cannot cheat Bob by revealing a different bit.



IV. Interactive Proof Systems

- 1. What is an Interactive Proof?
- 2. Interactive Proof Systems
- 3. Constant-Space Interactive Proofs
- 4. Private Coins vs. Public Coins
- 5. One-Way Functions for 1-Tape Machines

What is an Interactive Proof?



- An interaction between two (or more) parties has been studied in many cryptographic contexts.
- Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff (1989) studied a series of interactions between a prover (who presents a proof) and a verifier (who verifies the proof).
- This gave rise to a notion of interactive proof (IP) systems.
- In an IP system, a prover P sends a proof (either correct or wrong) and a verifier V checks if the proof is indeed correct.

	interactions	
A REF COOOD	<>	
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verifier	\rightarrow	prover

Intuitive Definition



- A language L has an IP system that satisfies the following two conditions:
 - For every x∈L, there exists a honest prover P such that V accepts a proof from P with probability at least 2/3; and
 For every x∉L, V rejects any proof from any (possibly
 - 2. For every x∉L, v rejects any proof from any (possic malicious) prover with probability at least 2/3.

A proof is a piece of information.



Underlying Machine Model

• Dwork-Stockmeyer IP system is illustrated as follows.



Interactive Proof Systems

- Let (P,V) be a pair of prover P and verifier V.
- Let L be a language over alphabet {0,1}.
- (P,V) is an interactive proof system for L if
 - V is a specified probabilistic machine,
 - P,V) satisfies the following conditions:
 - 1. (completeness) for every $x \in L$, $\Pr[(P,V)(x) = 1] \ge \frac{2}{3}$
 - 2. (soundness) for any $x \notin L$ and any prover B, $\Pr[(B,V)(x) = 1] \le \frac{1}{3}$

Constant-Space Interactive Proofs

- Dwork and Stockmeyer (1992) considered interactive proof (IP) systems with 2-way probabilistic finite automata (2pfa's).
- Major advantages: we can prove certain separation results that are impossible (at least at present) to obtain for polynomial-time or logarithmic-space bounded IP systems.
- IP((restrictions)) = the class of all languages that have IP systems satisfying the restrictions given in (restrictions).
- For example:
 - IP(2pfa,poly-time) = the class of all languages that have IP systems with 2pfa verifiers running in expected polynomial time.

Private Coins vs. Public Coins

- In an IP system, a verifier obtains random bits (by flipping coins) and decides his next actions. The verifier keeps those random bits secretly. A prover has no way knowing those bits of the verifier.
- This situation is described as the verifier playing with "private coins."
- In contrast, if the verifier reveals his random bits to the prover every time, then this situation is described as the verifier playing with "public coins."
- If the verifier uses "public coins" instead of "private coins," then we write AM((restriction)) in place of IP((restriction)).

"AM" stands for "Arthur-Merlin game."

Known Results

- Dwork and Stockmeyer (1992) obtained the following results.
- (Claim)
 - 1. $2PFA \subseteq AM(2pfa) \subseteq IP(2pfa, poly-time) \subseteq IP(2pfa)$
 - 2. Pal = { $x \in \{0,1\}^*$ | $x=x^R$ } is in IP(2pfa) but not in AM(2pfa).
 - Center = { u1v | u,v∈{0,1}*,|u|=|v| } is in AM(2pfa) but not in 2PFA.
- (*) We will return to this topic in Week 13.

Track Notation (revisited)

 To describe the notion of one-way function in the 1-tape linear-time model, we need to introduce a "track" notation

$$\begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ y_1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_2 \\ y_2 \end{bmatrix} \cdots \begin{bmatrix} x_n \\ y_n \end{bmatrix}, \text{ where } x = x_1 x_2 \cdots x_n \text{ and } y = y_1 y_2 \cdots y_n$$

 Even if |x| ≠ |y|, we want to use the same notation to express

$$\begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \#^k \end{bmatrix} \qquad \begin{bmatrix} x \#^k \\ y \end{bmatrix}$$

if |x| = |y|+k and $k \ge 1$ and |x|+k = |y| and $k \ge 1$, respectively, where # is a distinct "blank" symbol.
One-Way Functions for 1-Tape Machines I

- A total function $f: \Sigma_1^* \to \Sigma_2^*$ is called one-way if
 - 1. $f \in 1$ -FLIN, and
 - 2. there is no function $g \in 1$ -FLIN such that

$$f\left(g\left(\left[\begin{array}{c}f(x)\\1^{|x|}\end{array}\right]\right)\right) = f(x)$$

for all inputs x.

- When f is length-preserving, the above equality can be replaced by f(g(f(x))) = f(x).
 ∀x∈Σ₁* [|f(x)| = |x|]
- Theorem: [Tadaki-Yamakami-Lin (2010)]
 There is no one-way function in 1-FLIN.
- (*) In the next slide, we will see a proof sketch.

One-Way Functions for 1-Tape Machines II

 Recall 1-DLIN and 1-FLIN from Week 1, and 1-FLIN(partial) and 1-NLINMV from Week 6.

□ Proof Sketch:

- Assume by contradiction that a one-way function $f: \Sigma_1^* \rightarrow \Sigma_2^*$ exists in 1-FLIN.
- Define $f^{-1}([y \ 1^n]^T) = \{ x \# | y| = n, f(x) = y \}$ if $|y| \ge n$; $f^{-1}([y \ 1^n]^T) = \{ x \mid |x| = n, f(x) = y \}$ otherwise.
- Clearly, $f^{-1} \in 1$ -NLINMV.
- As seen in Week 6, since 1-NLINMV ⊑_{ref} 1-FLIN(partial), there is a refinement, say, g of f⁻¹ in 1-FLIN(partial).
- We then construct a 1DTM computing g in O(n) time.
- Since f⁻¹ ⊑_{ref} g, M converts f, a contradiction against our assumption.



V. Pseudorandomness for Automata

- 1. Negligible Functions
- 2. C-Pseudorandomness
- 3. Examples of C-Pseudorandom Languages

Negligible Functions

- We apply pseudorandomness to finite automata.
 - $\mathsf{R}^{\geq 0} = \{ z \in \mathsf{R} \mid z \geq 0 \}$
- First, we need a notion of negligible function.
- A real-valued function h: $N \rightarrow R^{\geq 0}$ is negligible \Leftrightarrow
 - ∀p: positive polynomial, h(n) ≤ 1/p(n) holds for all but finitely many numbers n∈N (super-polynomially small).
- Example: $h(n) = 1/2^n$, $h'(n) = 1/n^{\log(n)}$



Intuition: Pseudorandomness

- A Δ L denotes the symmetric difference (A L) \cup (L A).
- Intuitively, the C-pseudorandomness of L means: for any language A∈C and for almost all n's, |(A∆L)∩Σⁿ| is "nearly" a half of |Σⁿ|. (Fig.1)
- Equivalently: for any language A∈C and for almost all n's, |A∩(L∩Σⁿ)| is "nearly" equal to |A∩(Σⁿ-L)|. (Fig.2)



C-Pseudorandomness I



- Let L be any language over Σ with $|\Sigma| \ge 2$.
- Let C be any language family.



• (Claim) No language in C is C-pseudorandom.



C-Pseudorandomness II



- We may be focused on p-dense languages.
- A language L (over Σ) is weakly C-pseudorandom \Leftrightarrow
 - for all p-dense $A \in C$ (over Σ),

 $h'(n) =_{def} ||(A \cap L) \cap \Sigma^n| / |A \cap \Sigma^n| - \frac{1}{2}|$ is negligible.

- A language family D is (weakly) C-pseudorandom ⇔
 - D contains a (weakly) C-pseudorandom language.
- NOTE: Not known whether NP is P-pseudorandom.



$$\frac{\left|(A \cap L) \cap \Sigma^n\right|}{\left|A \cap \Sigma^n\right|} \to \frac{1}{2}$$

Examples of C-Pseudorandom Languages

- Let $x \odot y$ denote the (bitwise) binary inner product.
- Consider the following extended language in CFL.
 IP*={ axy | a∈{λ,0,1}, x,y∈{0,1}*, |x|=|y|,x^R⊙y≡1 (mod 2) }
- IP* is REG/n-pseudorandom. Hence, we obtain:
- Theorem: [Yamakami (2011)] CFL is REG/n-pseudorandom.
- The proof of this theorem utilizes the swapping lemma for regular languages, discussed in Week 5. (See the next slide.)

Swapping Lemma for REGs (revisited)

Swapping Lemma for REGs [Yamakami (2008),(2010)]

If L is regular, then ∃m>0 s.t. ∀n∈N ∀S⊆L∩∑ⁿ (|S|≥m)
 ∀i∈[n] ∃xy,uv∈S (|x|=|u|=i) [xy≠uv & uy,xv∈L].



• See Week 5 for the references.

CFL/n-Pseudorandom Languages I

- We discuss CFL/n-pseudorandom languages.
- Consider the languages

> IP+ = $\Sigma^{\leq 8} \cup$ (IP₃ $\cap \Sigma^{\geq 8}$) Σ^2 , where

> $P_3 = \{ axyz \mid a \in \{\lambda, 0, 1\}, x, y, z \in \{0, 1\}^*, |x| = |z|, |y| = 2|x|, (xz) \odot y^R \equiv 1 \pmod{2} \}$ (extension of IP*)

- CFL(2)/n is an advised version of CFL(2), which was discussed in Week 5.
- Lemma: [Yamakami (2016)] $L \in CFL(2)/n \iff \exists L_1, L_2 \in CFL/n \text{ s.t. } L = L_1 \cap L_2.$

CFL/n-Pseudorandom Languages II

- Theorem: [Yamakami (2016)]
 - 1. IP_3 and IP^+ are in $L \cap CFL(2)/n$.
 - 2. IP_3 and IP^+ are CFL/n-pseudorandom.
- For the latter claim of the above theorem, we need the swapping lemma for context-free languages discussed in Week 5. (See the next slide.)
- Corollary: [Yamakami (2016)]
 - 1. $L \cap CFL(2)/n \not\subset CFL/n$.
 - 2. CFL(2) ⊄ CFL/n.

Swapping Lemma for CFLs (revisited)

Swapping Lemma for CFLs [Yamakami, (2008,2016)]

• If L is context-free, then $\exists m > 0 \text{ s.t. } \forall n \ge 2 \forall S \subseteq L \cap \sum^{n} \forall j_{0}, k_{0} \in [2, n-1]_{Z}(k_{0} \ge 2j_{0}) \forall i \in [0, n] \forall j \in [j_{0}, k_{0}](i+j \le n) \forall u \in \sum^{j_{0}} (|S_{i,u}| < |S|/m(k_{0}-j_{0}+1)(n-j_{0}+1)) \exists x = x_{1}x_{2}x_{3}, y = y_{1}y_{2}y_{3} \in S (|x_{1}| = |y_{1}| = i)(|x_{2}| = |y_{2}| = j)(|x_{3}| = |y_{3}|) [x_{2} \ne y_{2} \& x_{1}y_{2}x_{3}, y_{1}x_{2}y_{3} \in L].$



• See Week 5 for the references.

Open Problems

- There are many open questions to solve.
- Is there any CFL/n-pseudorandom language in CFL(2) (instead of CFL(2)/n)?
- 2. Find natural languages that are C-pseudorandom against D for reasonable language families C and D.

VI. P-Denseness and Primeimmunity

- 1. P-Denseness
- 2. P-Dense REG-Immunity
- 3. C-Primeimmunity
- 4. Examples of C-Primeimmune Languages
- 5. C-Bi-Primeimmunity
- 6. Examples of C-Bi-Primeimmune Languages
- 7. A Connection to C-Pseudorandomness

C-Immunity (revisited)

- Recall the definition of C-immune languages in Week 5.
- Immunity is concerned with "finiteness."
- Let C be any nonempty language family.
- A language L is C-immune ⇔
 - 1) L is infinite, and
 - 2) no infinite subset A of L exists in C.
- A language family D is C-immune ⇔
 - D contains a C-immune language.



P-Denseness

- All known context-free REG-immune languages L make the ratio |L∩Σⁿ| / |Σⁿ| exponentially small.
 - E.g., L_{eq} and Pal_#
- A language L is polynomially dense (or p-dense) ⇔
 - There is a non-zero polynomial p s.t. |L∩Σⁿ| / |Σⁿ| ≥ 1/p(n) for all but finitely many n (i.e., only polynomially small).
- Polynomial denseness is a key to our further discussion.





P-Dense REG-Immunity



- What language family is p-dense REG-immune?
- Theorem: [Yamakami (2011)] $L \cap CFL/n$ is p-dense REG-immune.
- □ Proof Sketch:
- Cleraly, LCenter ∈ L ∩ CFL/n. Thus, it suffices to prove
 LCenter is p-dense REG-immune,
 by the pumping lemma for REGs.
- (Open Problem) Is CFL p-dense REG-immune?

C-Primeimmunity

- Let us introduce a variant of C-immunity using "p-dense" sets in place of "finite" sets.
- Let C be any language family.
- A language L is C-primeimmune ⇔
 - 1) L is p-dense, and
 - 2) L has no p-dense subset in C.
- A language family D is C-primeimmune ⇔
 - D contains a C-primeimmune language.
- **NOTE**: p-dense REG-immune \Rightarrow REG-primeimmune



Examples of C-Primeimmune Languages

- Equal = { $x \in \{0,1\}^* | \#_0(x) = \#_1(x) \}$ is not p-dense.
- Here, we consider its extended language:
 - Equal $_* = \{ aw \mid a \in \{\lambda, 0, 1\}, w \in Equal \}$
- (Claim)
 - 1. Equal. is p-dense.
 - 2. Equal. is in CFL.
 - 3. Equal. is not REG-immune.
 - 4. Equal. is REG/n-primeimmune.
- Theorem: [Yamakami (2011)] CFL is REG/n-primeimmune.
- □ **Proof**: This comes from Claims 2 & 4 above.



C-Bi-Primeimmunity

- Let C be any language family.
- A language L is C-bi-primeimmune ⇔
 - L and L^c are both C-primeimmune.
- A language family D is C-bi-primeimmune ⇔
 - D contains a C-bi-primeimmune language.



Examples of C-Bi-Primeimmune Languages

- Recall that $x \odot y$ is the (bitwise) inner product of x and y.
- Consider the following language:
 - IP_{*} = { axy | a∈{λ,0,1}, x,y ∈ {0,1}*, |x|=|y|, x^R⊙y ≡ 1 (mod 2) }.
- Lemma: [Yamakami (2011)]
 IP_{*} is REG/n-bi-primeimmune.
- Since IP_∗∈CFL, we conclude the following statement.
- Theorem: [Yamakami (2011)] CFL is REG/n-bi-primeimmune.

A Connection to C-Pseudorandomeness

- There is a connection to C-pseudorandomness.
- Lemma: [Yamakami (2011)]
 If L is weakly C-pseudorandom, then it is C-biprimeimmune.
- The converse does not hold, because the language Equal_∗ (∈ CFL) is REG-primeimmune but not weakly REG-pseudorandom.



VII. PRGs by Finite Automata

- 1. Pseudorandom Generators
- 2. Existence and Limitation
- 3. Proof Idea for the Theorem
- 4. Generators Against CFL/n

Pseudorandom Generators I

- Let G: $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ be any function.
- G has stretch factor s(n) ⇔
 - |G(x)|=s(|x|) for all $x \in \{0,1\}^*$.

- G fools a language A (over {0,1}*) ⇔
 - I(n) =_{def} | Prob_x[A(G(x))=1] Prob_y[A(y)=1] | is negligible, where |x|=n and |y|=s(|x|).
- Intuitively: A cannot tell the difference between truly random strings y and generated strings G(x).





Pseudorandom Generators II

- Let G: $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ be any function.
- G is a pseudorandom generator against C ⇔
 For all A ∈ C (over {0,1}), G fools A.
- G is a weakly pseudorandom generator against C ⇔
 For all p-dense A ∈ C (over {0,1}), G fools A.
- NOTE: pseudorandom generator ⇒ weakly pseudorandom generator



Connection to Pseudorandom Languages I

- There is a close connection between C-pseudorandom generators and C-pseudorandom languages.
- First, we introduce a notion of almost one-to-oneness.
- Let G: $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ have stretch factor n+1.
- G is almost 1-1 ⇔
 There is a negligible function t such that
 |{ G(x) | x∈{0,1}ⁿ }| = |{0,1}ⁿ|(1 t(n)) holds for all n.
- NOTE: If G is exactly 1-1, then t(n)=0.

Connection to Pseudorandom Languages II

- Let G: {0,1}*→ {0,1}* be any almost 1-1 function with stretch factor n+1.
- Let $S_G = \{ G(x) \mid x \in \{0,1\}^* \}$ be the image of G.
- Lemma: [Yamakami (2011)]
 G is a (weakly) pseudorandom generator against C ⇔
 - the image S_G of G is (weakly) C-pseudorandom.
- (Open Problem)

Can we weaken the above conditions of "almost 1-1" and "stretch factor n+1"?

Existence I



- Here, we show the existence of pseudorandom generators against REG/n.
- Recall the function class CFLSV_t.
- Theorem: [Yamakami (2011)]

There exists an almost 1-1 pseudorandom generator G in $CFLSV_t$ with stretch factor n+1 against REG/n.

• (*) In the next slide, we will give a sketch of the proof of the above theorem.

Existence II

□ Proof Sketch:

- First, we define an almost 1-1 function G: $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ with stretch factor n+1 such that $G \in CFLSV_t$ and $S_G = IP_*$, where S_G is the image $\{ G(x) \mid x \in \{0,1\}^* \}$ of G.
- We already know that IP_{*} is REG/n-pseudorandom.
- Since $S_G = IP_*$, S_G is REG/n-pseudorandom.
- As seen before, this implies that G is a pseudorandom generator against REG/n.



Non-Existence I

Next, we show a limitation of pseudorandom generators against REG/n.

- Theorem: [Yamakami (2011)]
 There is no almost 1-1 weakly pseudorandom generator in 1-FLIN with stretch factor n+1 against REG.
- (*) In the next slide, we will give a sketch of the proof.



Non-Existence II

Proof Sketch:

- Assume that such a generator G exists.
- Define H(xb) = G(x) for any $b \in \{0,1\}$.
- Since $H \in 1$ -FLIN, it follows that $H^{-1} \in 1$ -NLINMV.
- Take a refinement f of H⁻¹ in 1-FLIN(partial) by Week 6.
- Consider the image S_G of G. Note that $y \in S_G \leftrightarrow f(y) \downarrow$.
- Since $f \in 1$ -FLIN(partial), we obtain $S_G \in 1$ -DLIN = REG.
- It follows that S_G is REG-pseudorandom.
- Since REG cannot be weakly REG-pseudorandom, a contradiction follows.



Function Class CFLMV(2)/n

- Before moving to the next subject, we discuss an advised function class, called CFLMV(2)/n.
- Recall CFLMV(2) (= CFLMV \land CFLMV) from Week 6.
- Here, we consider its advised version, denoted by CFLMV(2)/n.
- Lemma: [Yamakami (2016)]

For any multi-valued partial function f, $f \in CFLMV(2)/n$ \Leftrightarrow there exist two multi-valued partial functions $g,h \in CFLMV/n$ such that $f(x) = g(x) \cap h(x)$ for any x.

• In other words, CFLMV(2)/n = CFLMV/n \land CFLMV/n.

Generators Against CFL/n I

- Next, we consider pseudorandom generators against CFL/n.
- Theorem: [Yamakami (2016)] There exists an almost 1-1 pseudorandom generator G in FL ∩ CFLMV(2)/n against CFL/n.
- Note that a famous design-theoretic method of Nisan and Wigderson (1994) does not provide a generator in FL ∩ CFLMV(2)/n.
- (*) In the next slide, we will show how to define such a G.

Definition of the Desired Generator

Proof Idea:

- We define the desired generator G as follows.
- Let us set the value G(w) with w = axy and |x|=|y|+1 for $a \in \{\lambda,0,1\}$ and $x,y \in \{0,1\}^*$.

• If
$$a \neq \lambda$$
, set $G(aw) = aG(xy)$.

- Assume $a = \lambda$. Let x = bz for $b \in \{0,1\}$ and k = (|w|-1)/2.
 - 1. If $w = bzy \wedge z^R \odot y \equiv 1 \pmod{2}$, set $G(w) = bzyb^c$.
 - 2. If $w = 1zy \land z^{\mathsf{R}} \odot y \equiv 0 \pmod{2}$, set G(w) = 1zy1.
 - 3. If $w = 0zy \wedge z^{R} \odot y \equiv 0 \pmod{2}$, there are two cases.
 - a. If \exists i [$z_{(k-i-1)} = 1$, set $G(w) = 0zy_*0$, where y_* is obtained from y by flipping only the i-th bit.
 - b. Otherwise, G(w) = 1zy1.



Generators Against CFL/n II

- Here, we present an impossibility result.
- Theorem: [Yamakami (2016)]
 There is no almost 1-1 weakly pseudorandom generator in CFLMV with stretch factor n+1 against CFL.
- The proof can be done by contradiction.



Open Problems

- There are many open questions to solve.
- 1. Does a 1-1 PRG against CFL/n exist in CFLMV(2)/n?
- 2. What happens if we use randomized advice instead of deterministic advice for pseudorandom generators?
- **3.** Is CFL p-sense REG-immune?
- 4. We can define CFL-primesimple languages. Find CFLprimesimple languages.
- 5. Is DCFL weakly REG/n-pseudorandom?
- 6. Construct efficient pseudorandom generators against Σ_k^{CFL} . (See Week 4 for Σ_k^{CFL} .)
- Find a natural 1-1 pseudorandom generator against REG/n.


Thank you for listening



I'm happy to take your question!



